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Feinstein: Persistence of Illogic: Further Constitutional Aspects of the Law

PERSISTENCE OF ILLOGIC: FURTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
LAW OF DEFAMATION
Until relatively recently, the common law of defamation
remained untouched by constitutional principles because of the
persistent view of the Supreme Court that libelous words did not
constitute a class of speech protected by the first amendment.'
But in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,2 the Court recognized
that the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and the
press did in fact impose limitations upon state libel laws.3 While
the necessity of a constitutional privilege in the defamation area
has remained unchallenged, the nature and scope of the privilege
have been the subjects of continuous debate among members of
the Court over the last thirteen years. Time, Inc. v. Firestone,4
decided by the Court last Term, demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has still offered no definitive ruling on constitutional privilege in defamation actions. The purpose of this article is to examine the history and development of this constitutional privilege
and to explicate, through an analysis of Firestone, the confusion
inherent in the latest tests derived by the Court.
In New York Times the Supreme Court recognized that the
significance of the first amendment is that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." ' 5 To ensure
against the possibility of state libel laws infringing on first
amendment rights as so construed, the Court recognized the need
for a constitutional privilege in the defamation area.6 This privilege would prevent public officials from recovering damages for
defamatory falsehoods concerning their official conduct unless
they proved with convincing clarity that the statement was made
with "actual malice."' Actual malice, the Court determined, exists when a statement is made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of its truth. 8
1. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). See Times Film Corp.
v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48 (1961). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Id. at 283. See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971).
4. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
5. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
6. Id. at 279.
7. Id. at 279-80.
8. Id. at 280.
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This privilege represents the recognition by the Court that
criticism of the government necessarily involves not only impersonal attacks on general policy, but also criticism of individuals
who develop and execute that policy. Consequently, the freedom
to criticize the government in an "uninhibited, robust and wideopen" fashion-crucial for a democratic society and compelled by
the first amendment-must inevitably involve criticism of individual government officials. In order to prevent individual government officials from vitiating this right to criticize, it is essential that the constitutional privilege protect individual critics
from defamation suits brought by plaintiffs who are public officials .?
Once the principle of New York Times was accepted," "the
invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public official to
government policy to public policy to matters in the public domain, like art, [seemed] to be overwhelming."" The Supreme
Court apparently agreed with this assessment because in the
companion cases of CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts and Associated
Press v. Walker,' the Court enlarged the scope of the New York
Times privilege to include actions brought by public figures for
defamatory falsehoods relating to their public conduct. Chief
Justice Warren noted that differentiation between public figures
and public officials has no basis in "law, logic, or First Amend9. See generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 S. CT. REv. 191.
10. See, e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir.
1966).
11. Kalven, supra note 9, at 221. See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
940 (1970); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. CBS, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). These cases held (even before the decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)) that "actual malice" should be applied to a matter of public
interest regardless of the plaintiff's public status.
12. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts was the result of an article
published by the petitioner in the Saturday Evening Post, which accused the respondent
of conspiring to "fix" a football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. Butts was the athletic director of the University of Georgia and "was a
well-known and respected figure in coaching ranks." Id. at 135-36. Associated Press v.
Walker stemmed from petitioner's news dispatch reporting on a riot on the University of
Mississippi campus which erupted over the attempt to enroll James Meredith by federal
marshalls. The dispatch reported that the respondent, General Walker, had personally led
a charge against the marshalls. Before this incident General Walker "had pursued a long
and honorable career in the United States Army. . . and had . . . been in command of
the federal troops during the school segregation confrontation at Little Rock, Arkansas,
in 1957." Id. at 140.
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ment policy."' 3 Public figures, like public officials, frequently influence society. The public therefore has a "legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of [public figures], and freedom
of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case
of 'public officials.'-"4 Public figures were defined as those persons who "commanded a substantial amount of independent
public interest at the time of publication"" either by position
alone or by "purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of
[their] personalit[ies] into the 'vortex' of an important public
controversy." 6
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 7 the privilege was further extended to "all discussion and communication involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether
the persons involved are famous or anonymous.""8 Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, pointed out that the concept which
clearly emerged from the decisions since New York Times was
that "the First Amendment's impact upon state libel laws derives
not so much from whether the plaintiff is a 'public official,'
'public figure,' or 'private individual,' as it derives from the question whether the allegedly defamatory publication concerns a
matter of public or general interest."'" In his view, to distinguish
between public and private figures would be as meaningless
within the context of first amendment guarantees as the distinction between public officials and public figures rejected in
Butts.2" The New York Times privilege was created not because
public officials had less of an interest in protecting their reputations than private individuals, but because the purpose of the
first amendment in encouraging wide-open political debate had
to be insured.' By extending application of the constitutional
privilege to private individuals involved in a matter of public
interest or concern, the Rosenbloom plurality expanded the privilege to the outermost boundaries of the theory of the first amend2
ment originally enunciated in New York Times. 1
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
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Three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 the Court
concluded that the Rosenbloom plurality failed to balance adequately this first amendment requirement of robust political debate against the interests that private individuals have in their
reputations.2 4 In Gertz the Court reconsidered the extent of a
publisher's constitutional privilege from liability for defamation
of a private individual.2 To the new majority which coalesced in
Gertz, 26 the threshold question was no longer the extent to which
the first amendment compelled displacement of the state libel
laws, but rather how to accommodate the interest of the press in
immunity from liability with the state interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to their reputations.2 7 The Court
concluded that the accommodation of these interests reached
with regard to public officials and public figures was correct, but
that a different rule should apply to private individuals.2
The majority in Gertz, unlike Justice Brennan in
Rosenbloom and Chief Justice Warren in Butts, had no difficulty
distinguishing among the different classes of defamation plaintiffs. The distinction was made on two grounds. First, public
plaintiffs have greater access to the media than private plaintiffs
Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1412 (1975).
23. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
24. Id. at 346. "The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the
Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find
unacceptable." Id.
25. Id. at 325.
26. In the intervening years between the decisions in Rosenbloom and Gertz the
membership of the Supreme Court changed. Justices Black and Harlan were succeeded
by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, and the transition from the Warren Court to the Burger
Court became more evident.
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974). In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75 (1966), Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion wrote:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation for unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent
system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
Id. at 92.
28. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974). But see Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976), which held that
Rosenbloom was the proper standard for determining the applicability of the "actual
malice" test in libel actions brought by corporations. Id. at 954. The district court held
that Rosenbloom was controlling in this limited context, despite its rejection in Gertz,
because corporations did not possess the individual interests which the Court sought to
protect in its later opinion. Id. at 955. See notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text,
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
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and thus are better able to counteract false statements about
themselves than are private plaintiffs. 0 Private individuals are
therefore more vulnerable to injury from defamatory falsehoods;
hence, the interest of the state in providing a remedy for such
persons is greater. 31 Secondly, the Court considered public officials and public figures to have voluntarily assumed the risk of
injury from defamatory falsehood because of their prominent status in society. 32 Private individuals, however, have not intentionally risked such injury to their reputations. Consequently, 33the
Court reasoned, their need for a remedy is more compelling.
The Supreme Court thus concluded in Gertz that a state may
require less than actual malice 34 to impose liability in defamation
suits concerning private individuals provided that some degree of
fault is shown. Gertz affirmed New York Times and Butts on
their facts35 but held that Butts was the outer limit to which the

actual malice standard could be applied. 6 While the Court was
unwilling to force a private individual to prove actual malice in
order to recover actual (or compensatory) damages, it was equally
unwilling to allow that individual to recover on the basis of common law strict liability. Some finding of fault was required by the
Constitution. 3 The states were permitted to define for themselves
a standard of liability less demanding than that required by New
31

York Times.

By its expansive application of constitutional principles to
the law of defamation, the Supreme Court in Gertz, in effect,
destroyed what was left of the common law. Under Rosenbloom
a private person, employing a strict liability theory, could still
recover under state law for a defamatory falsehood concerning
30. Id.

31. Id.
32. Id. at 345.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 348.
35. Id. at 343.
36. Id. at 342-43. "The Court today refuses to apply New York Times to the private
individual, as contrasted with the public official and the public figure. It thus withdraws
to the factual limits of the pre-Rosenbloom cases. It thereby fixes the outer boundary of
the New York Times doctrine ....
" Id. at 353. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 347. "Nor does the Constitution require us to draw so thin a line between
the drastic alternatives of the New York Times privilege and the common law of strict
liability for defamatory error." Id. at 346.
38. Id. at 347. Recovery under this lesser showing was limited by the Court to actual
injury. In order to recover punitive damages, "actual malice" would still have to be
proved. Id. at 349.
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activities not within the area of public or general interest.39 Gertz,
however, completely obliterated the distinction between defamatory falsehoods concerning a person's private and public activities, treating defamation in both areas the same. Recovery was
permitted only upon a showing of negligence at the very least.
Gertz also modified New York Times and Butts by requiring
proof of actual malice by every public person regardless of
40
whether the alleged defamation related to public conduct or not.
Consequently, the analysis shifted from the subject matter of the
alleged defamation to the status of the individual plaintiff. Instead of looking at whether a first amendment interest was presented by the facts of a particular case-whether the facts raised
an issue of public interest or concern-the Court looked at the
"nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particu'4
lar controversy giving rise to the defamation." '
By analyzing the facts on the basis of the plaintiff's status
in society without acknowledging the nature of the activity in
which the plaintiff was involved, the Court in Gertz reinterpreted
the first amendment. New York Times had erected a constitutional privilege to protect the media against crippling liability
resulting from defamation suits brought by public officials and
public figures. The Court recognized this privilege not because
such individuals had a lesser interest in protecting their reputations than private individuals, but because uninhibited debate on
public issues, guaranteed by the first amendment and critical to
the preservation of democratic government, would necessarily
and inevitably implicate discussion of public persons and their
involvement in important social issues. Gertz, on the other hand,
constructed a two-tiered constitutional privilege which would
apply regardless of the nature of the issues involved but which
would be defeasible on different standards of fault (either actual
malice or negligence) depending on the status of the individual
plaintiff. This meant that the first amendment protects all
speech about public persons and not just that which involves
public interest or concern. 2 It was exactly this kind of two-tiered
39. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). "We expressly leave open
the question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, controls the enforcement of
state libel laws for defamatory falsehoods published or broadcast by news media about a
person's activities not within the area of public or general interest." Id. at 44 n.12.
40. Eaton, supra note 22, at 1444. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974).
41. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
42. Eaton, supra note 22, at 1416.
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approach which Chief Justice Warren believed had no basis in
"law, logic, or First Amendment policy."4 3 In his concurring opinion in Gertz, Justice Blackmun echoed this belief by characterizing the result in that case as "illogical.""
The illogic of the holding in Gertz was aptly demonstrated
by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone.45 Firestone involved an action for libel brought by
Mary Alice Firestone against the publishers of Time magazine.
The action was based on an item which appeared in Time concerning the result of the domestic relations litigation between
Mrs. Firestone and her husband, Russell A. Firestone, "heir to
the immense Firestone rubber fortune."4 6 The item stated in pertinent part: "DIvoRcED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to
the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, this third
wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme
cruelty and adultery. ....
The divorce was the result of an action for separate maintenance48 instituted by Mrs. Firestone after she and her husband
separated in 1964.11 He counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds
of extreme cruelty and adultery." After a lengthy and nationally
publicized trial, 51 the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, issued a judgment granting the divorce requested by Mr.
Firestone. 52 The decree stated that the cause of action arose out
of the plaintiff wife's complaint for separate maintenance, and
that the defendant husband had answered and counterclaimed
for divorce on the grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty. The
court found the equities to be on the side of the defendant and
therefore granted his counterclaim for divorce. The court, however, also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $3,000 per
53
month as alimony.
43. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring). But see the opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 154-55.
44. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 353 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
45. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
46. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972).
47. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452 (1976).
48. An action for separate maintenance is a request for alimony unconnected with
the causes of divorce. See id. at 450.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
52. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450 (1976).
53. Id. at 450-51. The actual decree reads as follows:
This cause came on for final hearing before the court upon the plaintiff wife's
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Time received the Associated Press dispatch which had
flashed the news of the decree within hours of its issuance." It also
obtained an account from an article which was to run in the New
York Daily News the next day.- In an effort to verify the facts,
Time checked the story with its Maimi bureau chief and a
"stringer" in Palm Beach. 6 Shortly after publication Mrs. Firestone demanded a retraction 57 from Time as she considered its
report of her divorce to be libelous. The alleged libel was Time's
report that Mrs. Firestone had been found guilty of adulteryd
Time, however, refused to retract its report. Mrs. Firestone
commenced the libel action in March
1968 and the suit resulted
59
in a verdict of $100,000 for her.

On appeal the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed."0
The court held that Time was entitled to the New York Times
privilege because the divorce of Mary Alice Firestone was an
event of great public interest. Further, as there was no evidence
of actual malice by Time, the magazine was not liable for the
defamation.' The Florida Supreme Court reversed this ruling
and held that reports of divorce proceedings were not matters of
real public or general concern. Such reports were therefore not
constitutionally protected.6 2 On remand, the district court of apsecond amended complaint for separate maintenance (alimony unconnected
with the causes of divorce), the defendant husband's answer and counterclaim
for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery . . . . The premises
considered, it is thereupon ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. That the equities in this cause are with the defendant; that defendant's
counterclaim for divorce be and the same is hereby granted, and the bonds of
matrimony which have heretofore existed between the parties are hereby forever
dissolved. . . . 4. That the defendant shall pay unto the plaintiff the sum of
$3,000 per month as alimony beginning January 1, 1968, and a like sum on the
first day of each and every month thereafter until the death or remarriage of
the plaintiff ....
Id.
54. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
55. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 451 (1976); Brief for Petitioner at 5.
56. Id; Brief for Petitioner at 6.
57. A demand for retraction is a prerequisite to filing a libel suit under Florida law.
Id. at 452 n.1.
58. See text accompanying note 65 infra.
59. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
60. Id. at 390.
61. Id. The court relied on Rosenbloom in applying the New York Times privilege.
Id. at 388. With regard to the showing made by the plaintiff, the court stated: "Nowhere
was there proof Time was even negligent, much less intentionally false or in reckless
disregard of the truth." Id. at 390.
62. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla. 1972). See generally Note,
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peal held for Time on the basis of state law and directed entry of
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 3 The case was appealed
to the Florida Supreme Court a second time, where final judgment was rendered directing that the jury verdict for the plaintiff
be reinstated. 4 The court invoked the intervening decision in
Gertz as support for its holding that Time was negligent in its
publication of the item concerning Mrs. Firestone.15 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, Time contended that
the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court was contrary to the
holdings in Butts and Gertz because the respondent was a public
figure and because there was no evidence to support a finding of
actual malice.6
Under the holding in Gertz, the first question confronted by
the Court in Firestone was whether the respondent, Mrs. Firestone, was a public figure. Gertz defined as public figures, for all
purposes, those persons who assume roles of "especial prominence in the affairs of society," or who occupy positions of
"persuasive power and influence." 7 Other persons may be classified as public figures for a limited range of issues. These persons
were characterized by the Court as having "thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved ."6 Public figures were
to be identified "by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation." 69 The Firestonemajority, speaking through JusDefamation: "Real" Public Concern-A "More Apt" Test for ConstitutionalPrivilege?,
26 FLA. L. REv. 131 (1973).
63. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 279 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The district
court of appeal held for Time on the basis of the following points: (1) Damage to reputation is an essential ingredient of a libel action; (2) Time reported the divorce decree fairly
and accurately; (3) Plaintiff's (Mrs. Firestone's) evidence was insufficient to deprive Time
of the common law privilege for reports of judicial proceedings; and (4) Mrs. Firestone did
not prove any recoverable actual (compensatory) damages. Id. at 394.
64. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974).
65. Id. at 178. Time's negligence consisted of reporting that Mrs. Firestone had been
divorced on the grounds of adultery, even though she had been awarded alimony. Since
Florida law at the time would not allow alimony if there was a finding of adultery, the
divorce had to have been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty. Id. This error in the
divorce decree was explained by the Florida Supreme Court in Firestone v. Firestone, 263
So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972), five years after publication by Time.
66. Brief for Petitioner at 31, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). See also Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
68. Id. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947,95657 (D.D.C. 1976).
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
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tice Rehnquist, held that the respondent had not assumed a role
of "especial prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and . . . [had] not thrust herself to

the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it."" ° This finding
clearly ignores the widespread public attention enjoyed by the
respondent prior to the divorce action. Both she and her husband
were extremely well-known. In fact, Russell A. Firestone, "heir to
the immense Firestone rubber fortune,"' was identified by the
Supreme Court itself
as the "scion of one of America's wealthier
72
industrial families."

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held
in Carson v. Allied News Co. 3 that the wife of a public figure 4
"more or less automatically becomes at least a part-time public
figure herself." 75 The reasoning of this decision is clearly applicable to Mrs. Firestone who, as the wife of a prominent man, had
achieved "general fame or notoriety in the community."" As
noted by the Florida Supreme Court, the respondent was
"prominent among the '400' of Palm Beach society," and was
an active member
of the "sporting set."" Her divorce was the
"cause celebre" 9 of social circles across the country, and consequently the trial received national news coverage. 0 Moreover, it
is logical to assume that Mrs. Firestone became a prominent
member of Palm Beach society voluntarily. Her subscription to
a press clipping service suggests that she had an interest in, or at
least an awareness of, the publicity she received.5 ' As the Supreme Court held in Gertz, public figures invite attention and
comment about themselves; therefore, the press is entitled to act
70. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
71. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1972).
72. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450 (1976).
73. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
74. The plaintiffs in this defamation suit were Johnny Carson, the nationally known
television entertainer, and his wife, Joanna Holland. Id. at 209-10.
75. Id. at 210. Cf. Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), which held
that the children of famous parents (Ethel and Julius Rosenberg) were public figures, even
though they had changed their names and renounced the public spotlight.
76. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
77. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 751 (Fla. 1972).

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
81. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 486-87 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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on the assumption that such persons have chosen to assume the
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood.8 2
The Supreme Court in Firestone, however, ignored the distinction between public figures and private individuals which it
announced in Gertz.13 The conclusion that Mrs. Firestone was a
public figure, at least for the limited purpose of reports on the
judicial proceedings which she initiated, seems inescapable.8 4 As
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent: "Mrs. Firestone
[was] hardly in a position to suggest that she lacked access to
the media for purposes relating to her lawsuit. 8 s5 During the
course of the lawsuit she held several press conferences. The remedy of self-help, which distinguished a public figure from a private individual under Gertz,"S was clearly available to Mrs. Firestone. Additionally, Mrs. Firestone's involvement in publicized
social events and her self-initiated lawsuit demonstrated her voluntary exposure to the risk of defamatory falsehood.87 Justice
Marshall further observed:
Having placed herself in a position in which her activities were
of interest to a significant segment of the public, Mrs. Firestone
chose to initiate a lawsuit for separate maintenance, and most
significantly, held several press conferences in the course of that
lawsuit. If these actions for some reason fail to establish as a
certainty that Mrs. Firestone "voluntarily exposed [herself] to
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood" surely they
are sufficient to entitle the press to act on the assumption that
she did.
82. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). This analysis was used
recently by two district courts which classified the plaintiffs in defamation actions as
public figures. In Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
the plaintiff had extensive contacts with underworld figures and a longstanding relationship with Teamsters Union President Frank Fitzsimmons. Id. at 444. The court held that
the plaintiff was a public figure because he had "voluntarily engaged in a course that was
bound to invite attention and comment." Id. at 445. Similarly, in Buchanan v. Associated
Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1975), the court held that an accountant whose firm had
been retained to perform accounting services for the finance committee to reelect former
President Richard Nixon was a public figure for purposes of the lawsuit. See text accompanying note 68 supra. The court based its holding on the plaintiff's extensive involvement
with the finance committee, his willingness to participate and assist the committee in any
way, and the intense public interest (of which the plaintiff was aware) in the precise
activities in which he participated. Id. at 1202-03.
83. See text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
84. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
85. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 485 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
87. Id. at 345.
88. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 487 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, as a public figure, Mrs. Firestone was less deserving
of protection under Gertz, and the actual malice standard should
have been applicable.
Nevertheless, the majority rejected petitioner's contention
that respondent was a public figure because "[d]issolution of a
marriage through judicial proceedings [was] not the sort of
'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the marital
difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to
some portion of the reading public.""9 This reasoning implies that
the subject matter of the alleged defamation was somehow not
relevant to the "affairs of society," or did not create the kind of
public interest that was worthy of judicial protection.
By analyzing the nature of the public controversy in which
Mrs. Firestone was involved, the Court engaged in exactly that
kind of subject-matter analysis which Gertz sought to avoid. As
Justice Marshall wrote in dissent:
If there is one thing that is clear from Gertz, it is that we
explicitly rejected the position of the plurality in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., that the applicability of the New York Times
standard depends upon whether the subject matter of a report
is a matter of "public or general concern." . . . Having thus
rejected the appropriateness of judicial inquiry into "the legitimacy of interest in a particular event or subject," Gertz obviously did not intend to sanction any such inquiry by its use of
the term "public controversy.""
In Firestonethe majority did in fact inquire into the nature of the
subject matter of the alleged defamation, but it did so by inquiring into the nature of the public controversy in which the plaintiff
was involved.
It is here that the illogic of Gertz becomes most evident.
Under Gertz the focus of analysis must be on the degree of public
attention already enjoyed by the individual plaintiff, not on a
judicial characterization of the subject matter of the alleged defa89. Id. at 454. In its first opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that divorce
proceedings were not of "real" public or general concern: "[We perceive a clear distinction between mere curiosity, or the undeniably prevalent morbid or prurient intrigue with
scandal or with the potentially humorous misfortune of others, on the one hand and real
public or general concern on the other." Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla.
1972). But see Berg v. Minneapolis Star &Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948);
and Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959), which held that divorce
actions were newsworthy events of public or general interest.
90. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 487 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (citations omitted).
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mation as relevant or worthy of public interest and debate. If,
however, the subject matter is not relevant to or worthy of public
interest and debate, then speech which focuses on such subject
matter has no first amendment component and is not deserving
of a constitutional privilege. Firestone seems to indicate that
subject-matter analysis, although rejected in Gertz, will reappear
under the guise of determining whether one is a public figure. It
is illogical for the Court to say it will not use this method of
analysis when in fact it will-albeit without explicit recognition-in another setting.
While Justice Rehnquist was wrong-under either a Butts or
a Gertz analysis-in concluding that Mrs. Firestone was not a
public figure, he might have been correct in concluding, at least
impliedly, that there was little first amendment value in Time's
report of her divorce. Arguably, discussion of Mrs. Firestone's
divorce in the public press was not the kind of public debate
essential to the preservation of democratic government that New
York Times sought to protect. The problem is that the method
of analysis employed by the Court in Gertz, even if correctly
applied in Firestone, would not have led to the right result. If it
is agreed that under Gertz Mrs. Firestone is a public figure, then
whether the speech comprising the alleged defamation is necessary for uninhibited political debate, and therefore deserving of
first amendment protection, is irrelevant. Ifthe subject matter of
the speech (which determines its first amendment value) is irrelevant, then the foundation for the constitutional privilege in the
law of libel recognized by the Court in New York Times no longer
exists. Such an approach is unprincipled as well as illogical.
After determining that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure, the next question which the Supreme Court confronted was
whether there was any evidence of fault on the part of Time to
support the verdict reached in the trial court.2 At the outset, the
majority stated that if it were satisfied that one of the Florida
courts which reviewed this case had made a supportable finding
of fault, it would be "required to affirm the judgment below." 93
92. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
93. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 461-62 (1976).
The failure to submit the question of fault to the jury does not, of itself establish
noncompliance with the constitutional requirements established in Gertz. . ..
Nothing in the Constitution requires that assessment of fault in a civil case tried
in a state court be made by a jury, nor is there any prohibition against such a
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The question of fault had not been submitted to the jury at the
trial. 4 The Florida District Court of Appeal, acknowledging the
"elaborate procedures" undertaken by Time to ensure the accuracy of the article,9 5 noted that "[n]owhere was there proof Time
was even negligent, much less intentionally false or in reckless
disregard of the truth."9 On the other hand, the Florida Supreme
Court, in a passage of its opinion" which cited Gertz, held that
Time's account of the Firestone divorce was "a flagrant example
of 'journalistic negligence." "' The absence of a finding of fault
in the lower state courts indicates that the Florida Supreme
Court was not affirming a finding of fault, but was making such
a finding in the first instance.
Justice Rehnquist refused to read the Florida Supreme
Court's language as a "conscious determination"" of fault despite
the citation to Gertz, and was unwilling to review the evidence
of alleged fault himself.' As a result, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida was vacated, and the case was remanded
for further proceedings. 10' Justice Marshall observed that this result was "baffling."''0 Even assuming that the language of the
Florida Supreme Court was unclear, the citation to Gertz obviously indicated an intention either to find fault or to affirm a
finding of fault.103 Otherwise, the citation would have no meaning.
The prior history of this case reveals that the Florida Supreme
Court could not have intended to affirm a finding of fault because
there was no finding of fault below to affirm. The question was
not submitted to the jury at trial, and the district court of appeal
expressly held that there had been no evidence of negligence on
Time's part.0 4 The only possible reading of the Florida Supreme
Court's language then is that that court was itself making a findfinding being made in the first instance by an appellate, rather than a trial,
court.
Id. at 461.
94. Id. Under Florida law liability is established when it has been determined that
the publication was defamatory, that it was false, and that it caused the harm.
95. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
96. Id. at 390.
97. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974).
98. Id.
99. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463 (1976).
100. "[W~e are not inclined to canvass the record . . . ." Id. at 464.
101. Id.; Firestone v. Time, Inc., 332 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1976).
102. Id. at 491 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 492 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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ing of fault. Even assuming that there was no clear finding of
fault below, the Supreme Court arguably had a duty to "canvass
the record" to make such a determination itself. 15 By remanding
the case to the state court, the Firestone majority avoided this
task. 0 '
Gertz held that a finding of fault on some standard other
than strict liability was constitutionally required for recovery of
damages by a private individual in a defamation action.1 7 If negligence is now a constitutional standard,1 8 then the Supreme
Court must review the evidence to ensure compliance by the
states. As Justice Brennan pointed out in New York Times: "This

Court's duty is not limited to the elaboration of constitutional
principles; we must also in proper cases review the evidence to
make certain that those principles have been constitutionally
1 9 The Court refused to do so in Firestone, thus allowing
applied.""
the state to determine not only the standard of fault, but the
standard of proof as well. In effect, this negatived the possibility
of applying a constitutional standard and reopened the door to
the imposition of strict liability in another form. If the Court in
Gertz intended to eliminate strict liability in defamation actions,
it was illogical to construct a test lacking the necessary safeguards
to ensure the application of a constitutional standard.
105. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 888 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3487 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1977). See text accompanying note 99 supra. See generally Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464-70 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
106. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell extensively reviewed the evidence of fault
in this case and concluded that "unless there exists some basis for a finding of fault other
than that given by the Supreme Court of Florida there can be no liabilty." Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 470 n.9 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974). See Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976).
108. It is assumed that Florida will now apply a negligence standard in cases of this
kind. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 465 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). Cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Justice Brennan criticized the use of a
negligence test in libel actions involving the press: "Reasonable care is an 'elusive standard' that would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might
assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to
a name, picture or portrait." Id. at 50 (citation omitted). Despite the ruling in Gertz that
the states could impose such a negligence standard, several state courts have chosen to
apply the more stringent "actual malice" test in a Rosenbloom fact situation because they
perceive a simple negligence test as having a "chilling effect" on the media. See, e.g.,
Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976); Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975);
AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publishing, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580
(Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1975).
109. 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964), quoted in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 55 (1971).
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Conversely, if the majority had found, as had Justices White
and Marshall,"' that there was a "conscious determination" of
fault below, such a finding would have been "wholly unsupportable.""' The sole basis for the Florida Supreme Court's apparent
finding of negligence was that Time had erroneously reported
that Mrs. Firestone was divorced on the ground of adultery."' The
court reasoned that Time should have realized that a divorce
decree granting alimony could not have been based on adultery
under Florida law. By reasoning in this manner, the Florida Supreme Court assumed that Time either knew what the law was
or that it had a duty to determine what the law required. In effect,
the court held Time liable for accurately reporting what the divorce decree actually specified."13 As Justice Marshall stated:
"Time's responsibility was to report accurately what the trial
court did, not what it should have done." ' 4
Both the Florida Supreme Court and the majority of the
Supreme Court of the United States ignored the fact that the
Florida Supreme Court did not announce the exact basis for the
divorce decree until five years after Time had published its account."5 As the Florida District Court of Appeal observed, the
wording of the divorce decree was ambiguous and "would lead a
110. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 492 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See
also id. at 470 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 492 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 462-63.
113. Cf. Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. of App. 1975), in which
the defendant published an article in which the plaintiff was listed as having been arrested
in a major drug raid. In fact, the plaintiff had not been arrested. Defendant obtained
plaintiff's name from a list furnished to its reporter by the public relations director of the
Louisiana State Police. No error was made by the paper which accurately reproduced the
names as they appeared on the list. The error was in the list itself, which had been
prepared by the State Police. The trial judge noted that the newspaper could have easily
discovered the error by checking public records kept by the authorities who actually made
the arrests. Id. at 398. The appellate court, however, held that the newspaper was under
no duty to verify the information because its source was "reliable" and in a "proper
position of authority." Id. See also Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d
76 (1975).
114. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 493 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
Florida District Court of Appeal noted: "Ifthe press were charged with correctly analyzing
the legal intricacies of each news item, their pages would remain empty of substance."
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
115. The technical basis for the original divorce decree was "lack of domestication."
The Florida Supreme Court pointed out that that was not one of the statutory grounds
for divorce, but nevertheless affirmed the decree because the record supported a finding
of extreme cruelty, which was a proper statutory ground for divorce. Firestone v. Firestone,
263 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 1972).
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reasonable person to conclude that adultery had been committed17
...

,"16The Supreme Court held earlier in Time, Inc. v. Pape

that a rational interpretation of an ambiguous document was not
enough to support a finding of actual malice."' While the application of Pape to Firestone was rejected by the majority, 19 Justice
Marshall suggested that
the Court's evident concern [in Pape] that publishers be accorded the leeway to offer rational interpretations of ambiguous
documents was not restricted to cases in which the New York
Times standard [was] applicable. That concern requires that
protection for rational interpretations be accorded under the
fault standard contemplated by Gertz.'
While the trial court technically could not have granted the
divorce based on adultery, the language of its opinion certainly
raised a reasonable inference that it had; therefore, Time should
not have been held liable for reasonably interpreting an ambiguous document and accurately reporting that interpretation. 2'
"No amount of after the fact explanation by the Florida Supreme
Court of what the divorce decree meant or should have meant can
deprive petitioner of. . .constitutional protection, particularly
since . . . that would impose liability without fault contrary to

the repeated holdings of [the Supreme] Court." '22 The Supreme
Court of the United States should have reversed the judgment of
the Florida Supreme Court because there was no evidence of
fault, negligent or otherwise, on which liability could be predicated.
The conclusion is inescapable that Firestone was wrongly
decided. The Firestone opinion raises exactly those problems
which the Gertz analysis sought to avoid: ad hoc judicial scrutiny
of the subject matter of the defamatory falsehood and imposition
of liability by a state court without a constitutional fault stan116. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
117. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).

118. Id. at 290.
119. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 n.4 (1976).
120. Id. at 491 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also concurring opinion by Justice
Powell, joined by Justice Stewart at 464-70.
121. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). See Foster
v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3562
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1977), where the court held that a finding of negligence for publishing a
defamatory falsehood could not be "predicated upon 'a factual misstatement whose content would not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential.'" Id. at 819-20 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974)).
122. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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dard. But more importantly, Firestone raises the question
whether the Rosenbloom subject-matter analysis was really rejected in Gertz, or whether such an analysis will reappear through
the back door whenever the Court must decide who is a public
figure and who is not."'
Almost ten years after the Court's ruling in Butts, how and
where the line is drawn between public figures and private individuals is still unclear. As one federal district court observed:
"[D]efining public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish
to the wall. 1 24 Firestone suggests that a court base its decision
on the nature of the subject matter of the alleged defamation.
Mrs. Firestone was classified as a private citizen rather than as a
public figure because her divorce was not a "public controversy"
worthy of first amendment protection. 12 Yet under Gertz, public
figures are identified by scrutinizing the degree of public attention already surrounding the plaintiff. If Gertz had been applied
correctly in Firestone,Mrs. Firestone would have been held to be
a public figure because of her general fame and notoriety in Palm
Beach society and because of the national news coverage of her
divorce proceeding.
The Gertz test would eliminate the problem of permitting
lower court judges to decide what matters are of public interest;
the test would thereby prevent judges from "exercis[ing] moral
judgments in individual cases, determining that a medium's news
report is not the public's business even though the public may be
interested and even though the event is unquestionably newsworthy." 2 But by ignoring subject matter, the test destroys the distinction between defamation about a person's public conduct and
defamation about the private facts of one's life. This distinction
may have little meaning for public officials because any discus123. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
Accord, Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc., 542 F.2d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1976).
125. The Court also based its decision that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure on
its belief that she had not assumed a role of "especial prominence" in society, and that
she had not "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy." Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
126. NQte, Defamation: "Real" Public Concern-A "More Apt" Test for Constitutional Privilege?, 26 FLA. L. Ray. 131, 137 (1973). See also Cohen, A New Niche for the
Fault Principle:A Forthcoming Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 371 (1970). See generallyVirgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert,
denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
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sion about them which touches on their fitness for office is a
matter of public interest and is therefore constitutionally protected. 12 But prior to Gertz the distinction might have had some
meaning for public figures whose private lives were irrelevant to
their involvement in issues of public interest.l2s Arguably, then,
even if Mrs. Firestone were to be classified as a public figure, her
divorce might not be a matter of public interest and concern
29
worthy of first amendment protection.
In an attempt to set down broad rules of general application,
the Gertz test ignored the first amendment interest in democratic
debate which necessarily encompasses potentially defamatory
statements; yet it is certainly that interest which enabled the
Court to apply constitutional principles to the law of libel in the
first place. In New York Times the Supreme Court held that the
central meaning of the first amendment is that speech concerning
matters of public interest and concern be "uninhibited, robust
and wide-open." Therefore, as Justice Brennan suggested in
Rosenbloom: "If a matter is a subject of public or general interest,
it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not
'voluntarily' choose to become involved." ' Furthermore, the evil
of defamation is not lessened because a libelous statement concerns a public figure rather than a private person. Nor does a
public figure have any less interest in his or her "good name."
The law has made a distinction between the two because the state
has a greater interest in protecting the private person; it is assumed that private individuals cannot help themselves by counteracting the defamation and have not voluntarily assumed the
risk of public exposure.
There may be some merit in giving greater protection to pri127. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
128. See Eaton, supra note 22, at 1444. Under Gertz all-purpose public figures have,
in effect, no private lives because they are public figures for "all purposes," in other words,
all subjects. Limited public figures, however, are only public figures for a limited range
of issues. They can shield from the press those aspects of their lives not relevant to the
particular public controversy in which they are involved. See notes 67-68 supra and
accompanying text.
129. The Gertz test posed a dilemma for the Supreme Court in Firestone.If the Court
found that Mrs. Firestone was an all-purpose public figure, all aspects of her life, including
her divorce, would be open to comment by the press. If the Court characterized her as a
limited public figure, her divorce was the particular public controversy in which she was
involved, and therefore would still be open to comment. Thus, if the Court believed that
the subject matter of the alleged defamation concerning Mrs. Firestone was not a matter
of public interest, it necessarily had to find that she was not a public figure.
130. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971).
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vate individuals by making the standard for defeasance of the
constitutional privilege less than actual malice. But in order to
achieve principled results, the two-tiered privilege set forth in
Gertz must not ignore the rationale for the constitutional privilege. To do so would give the press more leeway in discussing
public figures than is constitutionally permissible, while allowing
less freedom when writing about private individuals.
The purpose of the Court in Gertz was to hand down a definitive ruling. As Justice Blackmun observed in his concurring opinion, it was of "profound importance for the Court to come to rest
in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority
position that eliminate[d] the unsureness engendered by
Rosenbloom's diversity.' 3' The effort which the Court made in

Gertz to simplify the constitutional aspects of the law of defamation was laudable. But the appearance of simplicity at the expense of shunting aside the central meaning of the first amendment is too prohibitive. Moreover, the result in Firestone clearly
demonstrates that this sought-for simplicity and certainty cannot
easily be attained. Until the Supreme Court develops a rule
which is both logical and easy to apply, the constitutional aspects
of defamation law will remain muddled and complex.
Terri S. Feinstein
131. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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